Under coverture in the United States, a married woman relinquished control of property and wages to her husband. Many U.S. states passed acts between 1850 and 1920 that expanded a married woman's right to her market earnings and to own separate property. The former were called married women's earnings acts (MWEAs) and the latter married women's property acts (MWPAs). Interest in the acts' effects is growing. Prior literature examined how the acts affected outcomes such as women's wealth-holding and educational attainment. The acts' impact on women's nonmarital birth decisions remains unstudied, however. We postulate that the acts caused women to perceived greater benefits from having children within rather than outside of marriage. We thus expect passage of MWPAs and MWEAs to reduce the likelihood that single women are mothers of young children. We use probit regression to analyze individual data from the U.S. Census for the years 1860 to 1920. We find that the property acts reduced the likelihood that single women have young children. We also find that the "de-coverture" acts' effects were stronger for literate women, U.S.-born women, in states with higher female labor force participation, and in more rural states, consistent with our predictions.
I. Introduction
Before the passage of reform legislation in the 19th century, most U.S. states followed the doctrine of coverture to govern a woman's property rights within the family. Coverture's name stems from the fact that a married woman lived almost entirely under her husband's legal "cover." A married woman -a feme covert -could not make contracts, buy or sell property, sue or be sued, own her market earnings, or draft wills. When a husband died, his wife could not be the guardian of their under-age children (Women, Enterprise and Society 2010) . In the unusual case of divorce, the husband held child custody rights.
Economists have examined the fundamental forces driving U.S. states' abolition of coverture starting around the middle of the 1800s (e.g., Geddes and Lueck 2002 , Doepke and Tertilt 2009 , Fernandez 2010 . Legal scholars have placed these developments in an international context by examining the significant changes in married women's rights and economic status occurring in many countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (e.g., Chused 1983 , Hamilton 1999 , Siegel 1994a , 1994b . Others have examined women's property legislation in detail, often focusing on changes in a particular state's law (e.g., Basch 1982 , Lazarou 1980 , Salmon 1982 .
Scholars in law and economics have also studied some of the consequences of these changes in women's economic rights in the United States and elsewhere for women's property holdings (e.g.
Cohen 1988, Shammas 1994 , Combs 2004 , 2005 , labor force participation (Roberts 2009 ) and school attendance (Roberts 2009 , Geddes et al. 2012 ). The impact of the acts on women's nonmarital births has remained unexamined, however. We address that gap by examining the effect of coverture on women's non-marital fertility. Given that almost 7 out of every 1000 single women had a child under age 5 in the years 1880 to 1920 this is a question worthy of study.
We first present a theoretical framework based on rational choice that generates predictions regarding coverture's effect on the probability of women having children out of marriage. Our central prediction is that the institution of coverture bolsters women's incentives to have children outside of marriage. Conversely, the abolition of this institution is expected to be associated with fewer children born out of marriage.
The extinction of coverture took place largely at the state level. Between 1850 and 1920, all but five states passed laws that were critical in strengthening married women's economic rights and in reducing the strictures of coverture: the Married Women's Property Acts (MWPAs) and the Earnings Acts (MWEAs) that expanded the rights of married women to respectively own their separate property and their market earnings. We expect that decreases in the frequency of nonmarital births will be associated with the acts' passage. We also predict that the impact of "decoverture" acts on non-marital motherhood will be stronger for literate women than for illiterates, for U.S.-born women than for foreign-born, in states with higher female labor force participation, and in more rural states.
We use difference-in-difference analysis, Census data and probit regression to examine whether the passage of each act type was accompanied by a reduction in the likelihood that women have children outside marriage. We also test our predictions regarding factors that may be associated with a stronger negative impact of MWPAs and MWEAs on the likelihood that single women became mothers.
The next section describes the legal setting created by coverture, changes embodied in the acts, and some sources of pressure to pass the acts. We offer a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the acts on women's non-marital fertility provide in Section III. Section IV describes our data set and the methods of estimation, while Sections V and VI reports estimation results and robustness checks, respectively. Section VII summarizes and concludes.
II. Legal Background
Under the English common law system of coverture, which applied in the majority of U.S. states prior to the acts, the property that a wife owned prior to marriage (a so-called feme sole) came under the control of the husband during marriage. 1 Therefore upon marriage a woman relinquished control over her personal property -which included movable property such as livestock, furniture, stocks and money -to her husband. The husband was permitted to dispose of it at any time. He could will it away at death (Shammas, Salmon, and Dahlin 1987, p. 3 We study the impact of two later acts: the married women's property acts (MWPAs), granting married women the right to own and control real and personal property, and the married women's earnings acts (MWEAs), granting married women the right to own their earnings from work outside the home. States passed those acts at different times, as summarized in Table 1 . We define married women's property acts as those granting the wife the power to manage and control her separate estate.
Management and control rights are more consistent with the creation of a true property right from an economic perspective, which emphasizes how the law allocates control over well-defined resources (e.g. Barzel 1997 ). The first statute granting married women control over their separate property is the New York Married Women's Property Act of 1848. All other states followed, most enacting MWPAs between 1850 and 1920, which is close to our study period.
1 As stated by Blackstone (1775-1779, Book II, Chapter 29): " . . . the very being and existence of the woman is suspended during coverture, or entirely merged and incorporated in that of the husband. And hence it follows, that whatever personal property belonged to the wife, before marriage, is by marriage absolutely vested in the husband." 2 An example is from the Acts of Alabama, 1846, No. 20 (p. 25) , which states: Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That the property of the wife at the time of the marriage, or which she may receive by descent, bequest, or gift, shall not be subject to the debts or liabilities of the husband, contracted or incurred before the marriage; nor shall the husband be liable to pay the antenuptial contracts or liabilities of the wife, further than the property received by the wife; but such property received by the wife, shall be liable to her debts notwithstanding the termination of the coverture. Approved, 31 st January, 1846.
Earnings acts, which granted married women a property right to their market earnings, are easier to identify than property acts and typically went through less modification. August (1990, p. 54-6) notes that one delegate explained that he had chosen the 'best provision to get us wives.' Also see Chused (1983) .
vestige of slavery. Upon their subjection it has been thought rests the basis of society; disturb that, and society crumbles into ruins. By the married women's property acts the first blow has been struck . . . The huge idol will sooner or later be broken into pieces." 6 We next describe a theoretical framework that generates predictions about the likely impact of changes in women's economic rights on their decision to bear children out of marriage. Our approach predicts that the common law institution of coverture reduces married women's incentives to have children within marriage, for several reasons. It thus implies that the de-coverture acts will enhance women's incentives to have children within marriage.
III. Theoretical framework
We consider a particular woman's choice that may be affected by the MWPAs and MWEAs:
having children within versus outside of marriage. We assume the woman is rational, consistent with rational choice models of childbearing proposed by economists, including Becker (1960 Becker ( , 1965 and Mincer (1963) . However, they assumed that married-couple households decide to have a child based on weighing costs and benefits. In contrast, in our rational choice model it is women who make a decision as to whether to have a child alone or while married. Prior economic models in which individuals -not couples -make fertility decisions include Grossbard-Shechtman (1986) and Ekert-Jaffe and Grossbard (2008) . While focusing on the individual, these models recognize that when individuals make childbearing decisions they take account of options offered by marriage markets, labor markets and other institutions. In marriage markets members of the other gender have the opportunity to express their preferences. [we need to include a discussion of birth control technology at that time; how well women were able to determine level of fertility?]
The Ekert-Jaffe and Grossbard (2008) model is similar to ours: it assumes that women make a decision on whether to first form a couple and then have a child or to have a child out-of-couple.
Ekert-Jaffe and Grossbard use contemporary Western data for countries with high rates of unmarried couple formation. They thus focus on women's decision to have a child alone or as part of a couple (married or not). We study the United States in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, when non-marital cohabitation was very rare. We thus limit our model to a choice between marital and non-marital fertility.
The decision-making model
Define Y as the present value of net benefits a woman expects to obtain if she becomes a mother while married and A as the present value of net expected benefits from becoming an unmarried mother. The difference is defined as a latent variable representing the net benefit of being a non-marital mother versus that of being a married mother. It is unobserved; we instead observe R, the decision to be an unmarried versus a married mother. A woman becomes an unmarried mother (R = 1) if the net benefits of having a non-marital birth and keeping the child exceed those of having a marital birth. The lower Y is relative to A, the higher the likelihood of an unmarried birth.
During the period 1850 to 1920, most births were marital. Assuming rationality, this implies that in most cases Y exceeded A. This is a period during which government programs helping single mothers were not available and the prospect of poverty often forced a mother to give up her child for adoption or care at an orphanage. The unmarried single mothers included in our sample were living with their children. The assumption of rationality implies that to them A exceeded Y.
Values A and Y include material and non-material net benefits, where net benefits equal benefits minus costs. An example of a material cost is the opportunity cost of forgone income from
paid work due to either marriage or childbearing. An example of material benefits that may be included in both Y and A is access to income of other household members such as monetary transfers from the child's father, whether he is alive or dead, to the mother. If she is married then the father is likely to take better financial care of his child's mother than if she is unmarried and Y is expected to exceed A. Y is also likely to include expected benefits that the mother may receive in case of separation or divorce. Ekert-Jaffe and Grossbard (2008) showed that women are more likely to opt for out-of-couple motherhood if laws regulating division of property in case of divorce are less protective of the interests of low-income divorced mothers and therefore expected Y is lower.
Coverture entailed significant costs for women who first married and then had children.
Once married, women lost control of their own earnings and of property they owned prior to marriage, or could have owned while married. Coverture thus reduced Y, the net benefits of having a child in marriage, by lowering married women's access to material resources they could have owned due to inheritance, business activity or labor force participation.
Coverture also led to a reduction in women's net benefits from having a child in marriage by reducing married women's bargaining power. Decision rights inside an organization such as a household or a firm are a direct function of the agents' opportunities outside the organization, and thus of their property rights. In the case of firms, agents who are employees tend to have less control over the fruits of their labor than independent contractors (Grossman and Hart 1986, Nobel Committee 2016) . This possible link between decision rights and property rights is one of the ways by which marriages resemble firms.
7 Under coverture men could use their property rights to control women's ability to make a variety of decisions affecting their personal wellbeing inside the household, including decisions regarding number of children, children's education and health. If the husband died, the wife was not even considered the legal guardian of her own fatherless children, possibly a byproduct of coverture.
Reduced levels of Y under coverture thus created incentives for women to have non-marital births. Conversely, the removal of coverture is expected to have lowered the likelihood of a nonmarital birth as it raised Y relative to A. Our main prediction is:
Prediction 1. Passage of the MWPAs and MWEAs is associated with lower rates of non-marital childbearing.
We also expect our model to be more applicable when we anticipate women's decisions to be more firmly based on rational choice. The propensity to act rationally may be a positive function of literacy. We therefore formulate:
Prediction 2. Passage of the MWPAs and MWEAs is more likely to be associated with lower rates of nonmarital childbearing among literate women than among illiterate ones.
Literacy also matters because it is related to job opportunities and potential earnings.
Therefore literate women living in states with higher labor force participation rates will be more likely to respond to incentives discouraging marital births, leading to: Eight states were community property states during the period we study. These states offered better protection for a marriage's low earners -typically women -in case of martial dissolution due to death or divorce. Therefore, from that point of view we expect the impact of a MWPA or MWEA to be less in community property states than in the rest of the United States.
However, these states also adopted many of the rulings of coverture states, so that passage of MWPA and MWEA is not expected to have a differential impact in community property states.
IV.
Data and Methods
We combine data on law passage with state-level data from the U.S. decennial census summary reports and from individual-level data from IPUMS, the Integrated Public Use Microdata We conducted extensive legal research to obtain the most accurate enactment dates possible utilizing a three-step process. The first was to examine current published lists of act dates. There are two major published lists: Khan (1996) and Hoff (1991 Wells (1879) . Those treatises were also helpful in obtaining additional documentation. Our final step was to further examine state session laws. We thus went back in time to determine if earlier acts than those obtained through the above steps were passed. The final dates we derive are similar, but not identical to, those from Hoff (1991), Khan (1996) , and Geddes and Lueck (2002) .
Our goal is to analyze the likelihood that an unmarried woman has a young child, which we define as a child under age 5. 10 We focus on white women since they are the majority and some data were collected around the time slavery ended. A single woman's decision to have a child is jointly determined with her labor force participation and possible migration. We do not use these variables at the individual level. We instead use state-level information on women's labor force participation and urbanization, since those are exogenous from an individual woman's perspective. Since we include state-and-year fixed effects, we created dummies for state's above-average urbanization and above-average participation 10 We were unable to obtain data on mothers of children younger than 5 due to constraints on how individual Census data on children's ages are coded.
of women in the labor force. We calculate an "urbanized" dummy from the individual Census data. It equals 1 if a state has an above-average percentage of urban population in a particular census year.
In turn, percent urban for each state and year was obtained from the U.S. decennial census summary reports. We also calculate a "high LFP" dummy that equals 1 if a state has an above-average rate of labor force participation for white women aged 20 to 40. Moreover, we use the state-level ratio of males to females and per capita wealth (defined as dollars of real and personal property per capita).
We use probit regressions given the low likelihood that single women have a young child.
To test Prediction 2, we estimate Equation 1 using our whole sample as well as for the separate sample of literate and illiterate women. To test for Prediction 3, we ran separate regressions for U.S.-born and foreign-born women. We also estimated models that include interaction terms between (1) law and 'high LFP' to test whether women reacted differently to the abolition of coverture where and when they had more opportunities to work in the labor force; and (2) law and 'urbanized' to test whether women's reaction to the abolition of coverture depended on how urbanized their state was at the time of the survey.
Estimates for 1860 to 1920. As reported in Table 1 1920. This allows us to examine whether we obtain similar results with our inferred variable to those obtained using actual marital status, and for the longer period 1860 to 1920.
V. Results
We use probit regression to estimate the likelihood that single women have a child under age 5 for the years 1880-1920, during which time the Census explicitly asked respondents for their marital status. Table 3 reports our basic estimates. Tables 4 and 5 examine whether the likelihood of being a single mother varies with the state's urbanization or labor force participation. Tables 6 and 7 consider whether the likelihood of being a single mother is different for U.S.-born versus foreignborn single women. Table 3 presents results of probit regressions where the dependent variable is the probit of (explicitly) single women having a child under 5. We focus on the "law" coefficient since that indicates whether a property act (MWPA) or an earnings act (MWEA) was in place at the time of the survey. Column 1 indicates that the property act has a negative association with white women being single moms. This confirms our principal prediction: the property act made it more appealing for women to be married, so they were less likely to have a child outside marriage after the property act's passage. We don't find a similar effect of the earnings act (column 2).
The effects of MWPAs and MWEAs.
An interesting question is why the property acts had more effects on non-marital childbearing than did earnings acts. It could be that more married women were likely to own or to possibly inherit property in the future than they were to earn an income in the labor force given the low rates of labor force participation of married women during the period we studied.
De-coverture and literacy. We tested whether the law's effect was a function of a woman's level of literacy. Since the prediction is based on the assumption that women make a rational choice, we also tested Prediction 2, whether the effect of the property and earnings acts were larger for literate women than for illiterate ones. Columns 3 to 6 present the basic regressions 1 and 2, separately for literate and illiterate women. It can be seen that the coefficient of property law is negative for both types of women. However, it is only statistically significant for literate women. This confirms prediction 2 for property acts. The earnings acts did not have a significant effect on single women's likelihood of being the mother of a young child.
Other results reported in Table 3 . As expected we find that as single women age they are more likely to be mothers, but the effect of age is not linear: the coefficient of 'age, squared' is negative, indicating that the likelihood of being a single mother peaks at a certain age. Literate women are less likely to have a child while single, which probably reflects their better marriage prospects.
De-coverture and women's labor force participation. Table 4 reports regressions testing whether the effect of the MWPA and MWEA acts depended on whether a woman resides in a state where the labor force participation of women is above average. Prediction 2' stated that the de-coverture acts would be more likely to be associated with lower rates of non-marital childbearing among literate women in states with higher labor force participation. It can be seen from columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 4 that the coefficient of interaction of law and above average female labor force participation is negative.
This means that in states with high female labor force participation the MWEAs (earnings acts) had a negative impact on the likelihood that single women had children. However, this effect was not restricted to literate women; it was also found for illiterate women. De-coverture and urbanization. Table 5 reports tests of whether the laws had a different impact in states that with an above average percent of the population living in urban areas. We interacted the law dummies with "urbanized" defined as a dummy equal to 1 if the state had an above average urban population. These results are reported in Table 5 . It can be seen that for the sample as a whole and for the subsample of literate U.S.-born white women aged 20 to 40 the Property law had a negative impact on the likelihood that a single woman has a child, but this negative effect is restricted to rural states. This is consistent with Prediction 4: among farmers property ownership is more likely to be an issue at marriage. It is also consistent with the proposition that in rural states the MWEA did not have an impact on the likelihood that single women have children. However, we also find that in urbanized states passage of the MWEAs was associated with increases in the likelihood that single women had children, which is a result that we find hard to explain. Tables 6 and 7 reports estimates of the basic regressions for U.S.-born and foreign-born women. It was predicted that U.S.-born women would be more knowledgeable about the implications of the property and earnings acts and therefore would respond more negatively to their passage in terms of their likelihood of being single mothers. It can be seen that the regressions in columns 1 to 4 of Table 6 , estimated for U.S.-born women, are very similar to the results obtained for the entire sample and reported in Table 3 (Note that 84 percent of our sample are U.S.-born). The only difference is that U.S.-born illiterate women seem to have reacted positively to the MWEAs, which is the opposite reaction to that of literate women whose behaviour is consistent with our economic model. In contrast, in Table 3 that coefficient was not statistically significant. Table 7 reports results for foreign-born women. Whether literate or not, the foreign-born women did not respond to the de-coverture acts in a way consistent with rational choice and our economic model. These two tables are thus supporting the prediction that stated that relative to foreign-born women U.S.-born women will be more in-tune with legal change and will respond more in line with an economic model. Table 8 reports results using the inferred single estimations.
De-coverture and U.S.-born status.

Results for longer period 1860 to 1920.
Columns 1 and 2 reproduce the results for our basic model using explicitly single status, copied from Table 3 . In columns 3 and 4 we re-estimate the basic regressions for the same years using the inferred single status method described in Appendix A.
VI. Robustness checks
We obtained the above estimates assuming a one-year lag between passage of a law and year of survey. We also estimated our models without a lag and with a two-year lag and found similar effects.
Eight states in our study had laws based on the French or Spanish system and followed the community property doctrine. In theory, that approach gives married women greater control over household property in case of marriage dissolution (see, e.g., Fernandez, 2009 ). Community property law, however, did not actually give women equal rights since husbands usually held exclusive control rights over joint property and wealth. We nevertheless examined whether women in those states reacted differently to the passage of de-coverture acts. When community property states are excluded the results are not very different from those presented above. These robustness checks are available upon request.
VII. Summary and conclusions
Under coverture a married woman in the United States relinquished property and wages to her husband. Many U.S. states passed acts between 1850 and 1920 that weakened or abolished coverture:
the married women's earnings acts (MWEAs) allowed married women to keep their market earnings, while the married women's property acts (MWPAs) allowed them to keep their property. We present an economic model that leads us to predict that coverture created incentives for women to have children outside marriage, whereas the process of ''de-coverture" via either MWPAs or MWEAs made it less beneficial for single women to have children. We analyzed data from the U.S. Census for the years 1880 to 1920 to test whether a state's passage of one of these acts is associated with a lower likelihood that single women were mothers of young children. Estimates based on Probit functions and including a variety of controls indicate that, as predicted, the property acts reduced the likelihood that single women aged 20 to 40 had children under age 5. If women stood to gain more (or to lose less) from marriage they were more likely to wait until marriage to have a child.
Also consistent with the theoretical framework are the findings that, relative to illiterate women, women who are literate were more likely to respond to de-coverture acts via reduced likelihood of having a child as a single woman. Likewise, U.S.-born women were more likely to respond to de-coverture than women not born in the U.S. and thus less aware of local legal settings.
Furthermore, we found that single women's likelihood of being the mother of a young child responded more to de-coverture in states with more opportunities for women to work in the labor force as reflected in higher labor force participation rates for women ages 20 to 40. Another finding that is consistent with our economic model is that the property acts had more impact on the likelihood that rural single women had a child under age 5. Property ownership among farmers was more likely to influence the marriage decision. However, we also find that in more urbanized states passage of the MWEAs was associated with increases in the likelihood that single women had children, a result we find hard to explain.
We hope that our research will inspire further investigation into the determinants of non-marital More specifically, Inferred Single was set equal to one if respondents had the following relationships to the household head: "Child," "Sibling," "Sibling-in-Law," "Grandchild," "Other relatives," "Partner, friend, visitor," or "Other non-relatives," and was set equal to zero otherwise. A very small number of respondents reported that their relationship to the household head was "parent" or "parent-in-law," and those were dropped from the sample. We also drop respondents who reported that their household head was an institutional inmate.
We then inferred that all women aged 20 to 40 reporting these types of relationship in the earlier years (1850 to 1870) were never married or single.
Appendix Table 3 and state and year fixed effects. Table 3 and state and year fixed effects. Table 3 and state and year fixed effects. 
